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Abstract
This paper analyzes the growth and stabilization experience in
26 transition economies in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union,
and Mongolia for the period 1989-1994. Inflation rates have declined
significantly in most countries following an inflation stabilization
program. Growth resumes after stabilization occurs, typically with a lag
of about two years. Reducing inflation thus appears to be a precondition
for growth. An econometric analysis of the short-run determinants of
inflation and growth illustrates the key roles of fixed exchange rates,
improved fiscal balances, and structural reforms in spurring growth and
lowering inflation, and confirms that inflation stabilization programs
have been beneficial for growth even after controlling for structural
reforms.
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Summary
This paper analyzes the growth and inflation performance of 26
transition economies in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
Mongolia during 1989-94. When the average performance for this group
is profiled, a bleak picture emerges. Real GDP has fallen uninterruptedly
since reforms began, while inflation has been high and rising, fueled by
fiscal deficits averaging more than 6 percent of GDP.
Such profiles in chronological time hide the fact that countries
started their inflation stabilization programs at different times. A
brighter picture emerges when the data are rearranged in stabilization time.
In the year of stabilization, inflation falls substantially and continues to
fall thereafter, as fiscal deficits are brought under control. More
remarkably, output quickly begins to recover and after two years growth is
positive. These results strongly suggest that reducing high inflation is a
precondition for the revival of growth.
After establishing the typical patterns of inflation and growth, the
paper conducts an econometric analysis of the main short-run determinants of
growth and inflation. As expected from the stabilization time profiles, it
finds that lower fiscal deficits have led to lower inflation and higher
growth. Moreover, pegged exchange rate regimes appear to have been more
effective in reducing inflation and thus raising growth. This evidence is
consistent with the idea that, while the reduction of fiscal deficits is a
key precondition for disinflation, a pegged exchange rate may help in
bringing about a more rapid disinflation from high inflation. Structural
reforms also appear to have played a vital role in reviving growth and
reducing inflation.

I. Introduction
More than 30 countries that were in the Soviet orbit or the former
Yugoslavia are currently in the process of economic transition from a
centrally planned to a market-based system. A complete list of countries in
such transition would include Cuba, Vietnam, China, and even certain African
countries like Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The focus of this paper,
however, will be on the nations of eastern Europe and those which were
effectively part of the former Soviet Union (FSU).
The transition can be said to have begun in 1989, with Poland
inaugurating its big bang stabilization and reform program on January 1,
1990. There were, of course, earlier attempts at reform among the
transition economies: Yugoslavia in the 1950s, Hungary in 1968, and even the
former Soviet Union at various times, including the attempts by Gorbachev.
These attempts, however, did not have the explicit goal of making the
transition to a market economy. At the time the transition began, there
was thus little direct experience of the process of economic transformation,
and those advising on and designing the reforms had to draw on general
principles and related experiences--the lessons from structural reforms in
developing countries in the 1980s and earlier, the experience of China since
the late 1970s, and previous reform efforts in the transition economies
themselves.
Mainstream analyses of the transition process generally emphasized
the need for action in six areas (see, for example, Lipton and Sachs
(1990) and Fischer and Gelb (1991)): macroeconomic stabilization, price
liberalization, trade liberalization and current account convertibility,
enterprise reform (especially privatization), the creation of a social
safety net, and the development of the institutional and legal framework
for a market economy (including the creation of a market-based financial
system). Price and trade liberalization would reinforce each other in
permitting international competition to affect domestic prices.
Given the goal of moving to a market economy, there could not be much
disagreement over the general proposition that reform was needed in these
areas. However, major controversies arose over the speed and sequencing
of reforms, and the strategy to be followed in each area. The debate over
the speed of reform was frequently cast in terms of "big bang" or "shock
therapy" versus gradualism. 1/ In practice, the big bang could apply only
to certain aspects of the reform process--macroeconomic stabilization and
price and trade liberalization--for the other three elements of the reform
1/ See Aslund (1995), Balcerowicz and Gelb (1994), and Sachs (1993).
For arguments favoring speedy reform strategies, see also Klaus (1994). For
theoretical analyses of the speed of transition, see Aghion and Blanchard
(1994), Castanheira and Roland (1995), and Cohen (1995). Kornai (1993)
presents a more gradualist view of optimal reform strategy. See also the
interviews with policymakers in Blejer and Coricelli (1995).
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process inherently take time. However, decisions to initiate action and
proceed in the other three areas could be taken earlier or later.
Interesting and critical as the answers to the questions of the optimal
speed and sequencing of reform are, it was necessary to make decisions on
how to proceed well before the evidence could be gathered. As time has
passed, the experiences of individual countries and groups of countries
have been examined and lessons drawn. More recently, as data have become
available, more quantitative analyses of the experience of the transition
economies have become available through the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) in its 1994 and 1995 Transition Reports, (de Melo,
Denizer and Gelb (1995), Havrylyshyn and Botousharov (1995), and Sahay and
Vegh (1996), among others).
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between stabilization
and growth. There are essentially two views on this issue. The first is
that stabilization is necessary for the resumption of growth. This view
draws on a priori arguments that inflation is bad for growth as well as
evidence that inflation is negatively associated with growth (see, for
instance, Fischer, 1993, and De Gregorio, 1993). Recent work by Bruno and
Easterly (1995), which argues that 40 percent per annum inflation is a red
line beyond which growth will not be sustained, is particularly convincing
in this regard, though it does not draw on the experience of the transition
economies.
The alternative view is that the transition economies are not like
market economies, and that inflation in transition economies therefore
cannot be reduced to below the 40-50 percent per annum range without
adversely affecting growth, unless key structural reforms--particularly
privatization and de-monopolization--have already been implemented. 1/
While no one argues that hyperinflation is good for growth, there are some
who assert that, because firms need access to easy credit, inflation rates
much below 10 percent per month are simply impossible if the economy is to
grow.
In this paper, we first present and summarize data on the experience
of growth and stabilization in 26 transition economies in eastern Europe,
the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia, for the period 1989-1994. When the
average performance for this group is profiled, a rather bleak picture
emerges: real GDP has fallen uninterruptedly since reforms began, while
1/ This latter argument has been strongly propounded by Grigory
Yavlinsky. Yavlinsky and Braguinsky (1994), for example, argue that de-
monopolization needs to precede stabilization. The view that a tight
monetary policy will not reduce the inflation rate in a monopolistic economy
is an old one, though there is nothing in the quantity theory of money that
requires a competitive economy for its operation. The familiar
counterargument is that the existence of monopolies affects the level of
prices, rather than their rate of change.
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inflation has been high and rising, fueled by fiscal deficits averaging more
than 6 percent of GDP. Such profiles in chronological time. however, hide
a simple but key fact: countries started their inflation stabilization
programs at different times. A brighter picture emerges when the data are
rearranged in stabilization time: in the year of stabilization, inflation
falls substantially and continues to fall thereafter, as fiscal deficits are
brought under control. More remarkably, output quickly begins to recover
and after two years growth is positive. These results strongly suggest that
reducing high inflation is a precondition for the revival of growth.
After establishing the typical patterns of inflation and growth, we
conduct an econometric analysis of the main short-run determinants of growth
and inflation. As expected from the stabilization time profiles, we find
that lower fiscal deficits have led to lower inflation and higher growth.
Moreover, pegged exchange rate regimes appear to have been more effective
in reducing inflation and thus raising growth. This evidence is consistent
with the idea that while the reduction of fiscal deficits is a key
precondition for disinflation, a pegged exchange rate may help in bringing
about a more rapid disinflation from high inflation. Structural reforms
also appear to have played a vital role in reviving growth and reducing
inflation.
II. Recent Experience in the Transition Economies
This section examines patterns of GDP growth, inflation, and fiscal
deficits for 26 economies in transition in eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and Mongolia. Warnings about the data are essential before
proceeding.
1. Data caveats
Most of the data used in this paper, which are available on request
from the authors, have been provided to us by IMF economists working on
these countries. They are based on estimates by national authorities or
made by IMF economists for working purposes before official estimates become
available. Given the often fragmentary information with which the IMF has
to work and the differences in definitions of variables across countries,
the country economists would put wide confidence intervals around the data.
Thus, while it is customary when using data to issue warnings and then
proceed, it is important in this case to emphasize that the biases in the
data--particularly in output data--may well be very large and may affect
some of the reported results.
There are two broad sets of qualifications. First, the output data are
likely to be seriously biased for both conceptual and measurement reasons.
At a conceptual level, the prices at which goods were valued before the
transition process began were out of line: the quality of goods was
typically very poor and even purchasing power parity calculations are
unlikely to capture the quality differences; goods were frequently not
available at any price; and relative prices were different from world
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prices. The combined impact of these factors is likely to overstate the
decline in output and the increase in prices that have been such an
extraordinary feature of the transition process. To understand why, imagine
the extreme hypothetical situation in which goods had a positive price in
the base period according to the national accounting system, but had zero
value on the world market. Then, it could easily occur that output declines
in terms of base period prices, but rises in terms of world market
prices. 1/
Second, there is a serious measurement problem. Many of the republics
of the former Soviet Union have had to build new independent statistical
services, an inevitably slow process. Where earlier statistical systems did
exist, they had been set up to measure output from the state sector. As the
state sector output declines and private sector output rises, an increasing
share of output is not recorded. Although no comprehensive re-estimates of
GDP exist, Berg and Sachs (1992) provide a detailed analysis of the decline
in Polish output between 1989 and 1990. They favor a demand-based estimate
(that is, one based on consumption, investment, and net exports) which
suggests a decline of 4.9 percent over a supply-based estimate (that is, one
based on sectoral shares of output in agriculture, industry, and services)
of a decline of 8.7 percent; both to be compared with a 12 percent decline
in the official data. In general, in transition economies official
statistical reports place greater reliance on supply-based estimates.
Dobozi and Pohl (1995) estimate the drop in GDP using power consumption as
a proxy for changes in output. They argue not only that output declines are
much smaller than official estimates for virtually all transition countries
but also that official underreporting in the countries of the former Soviet
Union has been much higher than in eastern Europe. 2/ Kaufmann and
Kaliberda (1995) present calculations of the size of the unofficial economy,
also based in large part on electricity consumption. Their preliminary
conclusions are that on average the growth of the unofficial economy reduces
output declines for countries of the former Soviet Union by about half, but
with wide variations across countries.
Some of the measurement problems related to output data also apply to
inflation. Since price increases in the previous controlled-price regime
may have been disguised as quality improvements and inflation in the black
markets simply ignored, inflation during the transition may have been
overestimated. Furthermore, during a period of price liberalization, both
Laspeyres (base-year weighted) and Paasche (current-year weighted) price
indices are likely to be biased upwards (see Osband, 1991). The
1/ The opposite phenomenon happened in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,
when growth in base year prices far exceeded that in later period prices
(Fischer, 1994).
2/ Dobozi (1995) presents further estimates. In a letter to the editor
of Transition (April 1995, p. 11), Koen criticizes the method, pointing to
several implausible results, for instance, that output in Poland fell more
in 1992 than indicated by the official data.
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mismeasurement of inflation is likely to have been greater in the initial
stages of the transition process when prices were freed than in later stages
when relative prices better reflected the scarcity of goods.
2. Basic information and indicators
Table 1 lists the 26 countries in eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and Mongolia for which we have comprehensive data for the period
1989-1994. 1/ In the judgment of the IMF economists working on those
countries, stabilization plans have been implemented in 25 of the 26
countries, with Turkmenistan being the exception. For each country, we
list the date on which the stabilization program was implemented. The date
given is the starting date of a country's inflation stabilization program,
and not necessarily the starting date of an IMF program. 2/ When several
stabilization attempts have been made (which was the case in six countries),
we take the most serious attempt (as of mid-1995) as the reference
date. 3/
The third column of Table 1 indicates the exchange rate regime adopted
during the stabilization program. Countries that announced an exchange rate
peg, including a crawling peg, are classified as having a fixed rate
regime. 4/ In two cases--Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYRM)--the exchange rate regime is classified as a peg on the
basis of the policies actually implemented, even though the authorities did
1/ The 26 nations in Table 1 are closely comparable to the 28 countries
in the list appearing in Murrell's paper in this symposium. We exclude
Serbia for lack of sufficient data, and East Germany because of the special
circumstances of its transition--namely, reunification with a wealthy and
industrialized West Germany. While our study excludes China, Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam, we do believe that there is much to be learned from the
experience of these countries: the interested reader might begin with Gelb,
Jefferson and Singh (1993), and Sachs and Woo (1994).
2/ In practice, however, most stabilization dates coincide with the
starting date of an arrangement with the Fund.
3/ In principle, for the quantitative exercises undertaken below, all
stabilization attempts should be included in the sample. However, due to
the short sample period these data points would not be statistically
independent, which would imply "double-counting" for the purposes of
quantitative analysis. The choice of a particular stabilization program--
when there have been multiple attempts--necessarily involved a judgment
call on our part. We should stress through that the judgment about the
seriousness of the stabilization attempt was not based on ex-post inflation
performance but rather on an evaluation of the policy package associated
with the stabilization attempt.
4/ Latvia and Lithuania had flexible rate regimes at the time of
stabilization, but later moved to a fixed rate and hence are listed as
flexible/fixed. We include Russia in the category of flexible since it
did not move to an exchange rate band until July 1995.
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Table 1. Initial Conditions and Stabilization Programs in Transition Economies
Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Moldova
Mongolia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Stabilization
program
date
August 1992
December 1994
January 1995
November 1994 3/
February 1991 3/
October 1993
January 1991
June 1992
September 1994
March 1990
January 1994
May 1993
June 1992
June 1992
January 1994
September 1993
October 1992 3/
January 1990
October 1993 3/
April 1995 3/
January 1991
February 1992
February 1995 3/
Not started
November 1994
November 1994
Exchange
regime
adopted
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible
Fixed
Fixed
Fixed
Flexible
Fixed
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible/Fixed 4/
Flexible/Fixed 4/
Fixed
Flexible
Flexible
Fixed
Flexible
Flexible
Fixed
Flexible
Flexible
Not applicable
Flexible
Flexible
CMEA exports
to total GDP
(1990) 1/
2.3
21.3
33.1
44.5
15.3
5.6
9.8
27.2
19.1
9.8
17.8
21.3
31.3
33.7
5.6
24.8
17.3
16.5
3.3
17.9
9.8
4.6
22.1
33.6
24.6
24.0
GNP\capita
at PPP
(US$1988) 2/
1386
4923
4456
7218
5968
NA
NA
9078
6390
6569
4666
3244
7911
6816
NA
4596
NA
4941
3722
7519
NA
10663
2730
3825
5536
3046
Sources: IMF staff estimates; national authorities; De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995).
1/ CMEA stands for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—a regional trading
arrangement comprising the former USSR and 9 other Soviet bloc countries. In the
case of FSU countries, the ratios are FSU exports to GDP.
2/ As currencies have generally been undervalued during the transition, the PPP measures
are far higher than measures in US dollars based on market exchange rates.
3/These countries had more than one stabilization attempt.
4/ The Latvian currency was pegged to the SDR in February 1994; Lithuania adopted a currency
board in April 1994. Both countries had flexible exchange rate regimes prior to these dates.
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not explicitly announce it as such. Of course, many countries, in
particular Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic, listed as having adopted a
flexible exchange rate regime have often intervened in foreign exchange
markets to stabilize the exchange rate.
The last two columns in Table 1 relate to initial conditions of the
economy: estimates of per capita GNP in 1988, on a purchasing power parity
basis, and the ratio of CMEA exports to GDP in 1990--both these measures are
taken from de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995). (CMEA stands for Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, a trading arrangement among the economies in the
Soviet orbit.) The purchasing power parity GNP data provide a pretransition
estimate of the relative income levels of the transition economies; current
estimates, in dollars, would be far lower. The ratio of CMEA exports to GDP
is an indicator of the extent of the shock the Soviet bloc countries
suffered as their previous trading arrangements collapsed in the early
1990s. In the absence of data on CMEA exports for FSU countries, intra-FSU
exports are reported for FSU countries.
Table 2 provides information on inflation and output performance in all
26 economies during 1989-94. The inflation rate is based on the consumer
price index (CPI) when available; when the CPI was not available or the
series was too short, the retail price index was used. Depending on whether
inflation (or any other variable) is measured within a particular period (an
"end-period" measure) or as an average in a particular period as compared to
a previous period (an "average" measure), comparisons across countries or
across time within the same country are likely to differ, particularly when
inflation rates are high and variable. It is more common to report average
measures, as these are more useful in studying and comparing the evolution
of inflation over time. On the other hand, end-period measures are likely
to convey more information if the focus is on developments within a
particular period or on the response to policy variables within a short time
period. Accordingly, average measures are reported in profiling the time
path of inflation, while end-period measures are used in documenting extreme
annual values and in conducting the econometric exercises.
Inflation has been extremely high in the transition economies. Of the
26 countries listed in Table 1, 22 experienced at least triple-digit annual
inflation, in the twelve months preceding the month the stabilization
program was implemented. The remaining four countries--the Czech Republic,
the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Tajikistan--had double-digit inflation.
By the end of 1994, however, over half the countries had reduced inflation
to the double-digit range, with Croatia having moved all the way to
deflation. The maximum inflation rate was typically recorded at the start
of the transition process, when price and, in most cases, trade controls
were lifted. A qualification to these high inflation numbers is in order,
as part of the recorded inflation during the year in which prices were freed
was accounted for by one-time price jumps that eliminated the monetary
overhang from previous years (see Sahay and Vegh (1996) for details).
Table 2 shows the year in which inflation was highest and the annual rate
of inflation in that year.
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Table 2. Inflation and Output Performance in Transition Economies, 1989-94
Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Moldova
Mongolia
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Year in
which
inflation
was
highest 1/
1992
1993
1994
1993
1991
1993
1991
1992
1994
1990
1992
1993
1992
1992
1992
1992
1992
1989
1993
1992
1991
1991
1993
1993
1993
1994
All transition economies 5/
Eastern Europe and Baltics 5/
FSU and Mongolia 5/
Maximum
annual
inflation 1/
236.6
10896.2
1788.0
1994.0
338.8
1149.7
52.1
946.7
8273.5
34.6
2566.6
1365.6
958.2
1162.6
1927.3
2198.4
325.0
639.6
295.5
2510.4
58.3
246.7
7343.7
9743.0
10155.0
1232.8
2632.3
619.0
4645.6
Year in
which
inflation
fell
below 50% 1/2/
1993
—
—
—
—
1994
1992
1993
—
n.a
—
—
1993
1994
—
—
—
1992
—
—
1992
1993
1994
—
—
—
Year in
which
output
was
lowest 3/
1992
1993
1994
1994
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1993
1994
1994
1993
1993
1994
1994
1993
1991
1992
1994
1993
1992
1994
1994
1994
1994
Cumulative
output
decline
(1989=100)
3/
39.9
66.8
59.0
39.3
27.4
36.9
21.4
34.9
74.6
18.3
51.2
50.6
52.0
61.1
45.2
60.6
22.3
17.8
26.4
48.3
25.1
16.8
61.3
36.5
52.1
15.6
40.8
32.6
49.1
Cumulative
output
growth
since lowest
level 4/
19.9
5.4
—
—
1.4
1.1
2.5
3.0
—
2.1
2.8
1.7
2.1
13.0
4.8
—
4.8
6.9
—
—
—
—
Sources: IMF staff estimates; national authorities.
1/ Inflation calculated from December to December.
2/ A " - - " indicates that inflation was above 50% during the transition years, as of 1994. In Hungary's
case, this criterion is not applicable because inflation was below 50% even before 1989.
3/ Output decline from 1989 to the year in which output was lowest. For countries in which
output has not begun to grow, 1994 is taken as the year of minimum output. GDP measured on
an annual average basis.
4/ Lowest level refers to the lowest output level reached during 1989-94. A " - - " indicates that no
positive growth has been recorded as of 1994.
5/ Simple average.
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Inflation in the transition economies often met Cagan's (1956)
definition of a hyperinflation--inflation exceeding 50 percent in a period
of one month or less. The classic hyperinflations studied by Cagan (1956)
took place in the aftermath of the first (upon the breakup of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire) and second world wars. Although inflation exceeded 50
percent in at least one month in 17 out of the 26 countries in our sample,
it persisted at this rate for more than four months in only two countries,
Armenia and Georgia. 1/ In most countries, the brief hyperinflationary
outburst reflected the elimination of the monetary overhang upon price
liberalization.
The reported cumulative output declines in the transition economies
range from a minimum of 15.6 percent in Uzbekistan to an almost incredible
74.6 percent in Georgia. Table 2 shows the year in which output was lowest,
and the cumulative output decline in these 26 economies. 2/ As already
noted, these data are certainly inaccurate, perhaps highly so, with some
estimates suggesting that output in the countries of the former Soviet Union
decreased on average by about one half the reported amounts. Some of the
largest output declines were recorded in countries that experienced civil
war or trade embargoes, such as Croatia, FYRM, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
and Tajikistan. From a welfare point of view, the significance of aggregate
output measures should also be qualified, in light of the massive
redistribution of income which is taking place during the transition
process.
The overall picture of poor economic performance conveyed by the
indicators just discussed is summarized in Figure 1. 3/ Panel (a) shows
the (unweighted) average growth rate of measured real GDP since 1989--which
we take to be the year in which the transformation process began--until
1994. Measured growth has on average been negative in every year. The
growth rate reached a trough in 1992, reflecting the effects of the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the collapse of CMEA trade. The growth rate then
increased, but remained negative. The corresponding plot for the level of
real GDP in panel (b) shows that, on average, GDP in 1994 was about 60
percent of its initial level. Despite the gloom of the aggregate output
data, it should be noted that output growth was positive in more than half
of the 26 economies in 1994. The story on inflation since the start of the
1/ Serbia, which is not in our sample, also experienced hyperinflation --
by Cagan's definition--during 1993 and part of 1994 (Bogetic, Dragutinovic,
and Petrovic (1994), and IMF staff estimates). All three countries--
Armenia, Georgia, and Serbia--were affected by war.
2/ For countries in which output has not begun to grow, we take 1994 as
the year of minimum output. This means that the eventual recorded maximum
output decline for some of the economies is likely to exceed the level
reported in Table 2.
3/ For reasons explained later, Turkmenistan is excluded from the time
profiles in all figures and from the econometric analysis.
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transition process, presented in panel (c), appears equally disturbing, with
average inflation rising markedly since 1991. Panel (d) in Figure 1
profiles the fiscal balance of the government as a percent of GDP; the data
are official estimates, based mainly on IMF staff discussions with the
national authorities. An attempt was made to define the fiscal balance on a
commitment, rather than a cash, basis; when not available the fiscal balance
was reported on a cash basis. Also, the general government budget figures
are reported; when not available, central government data are used. Panel
(d) highlights the large fiscal deficits during the transition.
3. Stabilization time
The picture conveyed by the data just presented is obscured by looking
at profiles in chronological time. As Table 1 indicates, countries started
their stabilization programs at different points in chronological time. An
alternative way of looking at the data is to compute the profiles in
"stabilization time." 1/ Stabilization time is denoted by T+j, where T is
the year in which the stabilization program was implemented and j is the
number of years preceding or following the year of stabilization. In the
case of Poland, for instance, which stabilized in 1990, the year 1990 takes
the value T in stabilization time ,and a year such as 1994 takes the value
T+4. We then compute the average value for each variable in stabilization
time. For example, GDP growth in the stabilization year is averaged for all
countries, and this average is graphed at time T in panel (a) of Figure 2.
The average for GDP growth one year after stabilization is graphed at time
T+l in that panel, and so on. Note that the number of observations for each
year in stabilization time may differ. For example, there are only two
observations relating to year T+4--those for Hungary and Poland whose
stabilizations started in 1990. For the purposes of the time profiles shown
in the paper, we report averages only for those years in stabilization time
for which there are at least 3 observations.
The shift from chronological time in Figure 1 to stabilization time in
Figure 2 changes the picture dramatically. Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows real
GDP growth falling until the year of stabilization, but then recovering,
with growth on average becoming positive in year T+2. Panel (b) shows
correspondingly that, in terms of levels, real GDP begins to increase two
years after stabilization. Panel (c) shows that inflation, in turn, peaks
in the year before stabilization, comes down very sharply when the
stabilization plan is implemented, and remains low thereafter. 2/ The
behavior of fiscal balances roughly mirrors the behavior of inflation.
1/ Of the 26 countries in the sample, Turkmenistan was excluded in
computing profiles in stabilization time because there has been no
stabilization attempt as of mid-1995.
2/ We do not show profiles of money growth, which would look very similar
to the inflation profiles. Havrylyshyn and Botousharov (1995) present
evidence showing a strong positive correlation between money growth and
inflation for the transition economies.
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Panel (d) in Figure 2 shows very large average fiscal deficits before
stabilization--around 8-10 percent of GDP--followed by a significant
improvement in the year of stabilization and, with a brief interruption,
continued improvement. 1/ The message that emerges from Figure 2 is that
real GDP rebounds following inflation stabilization, which in turn appears
highly correlated with the improvement in the public finances.
Since there were systematic differences in the date of stabilization
between the countries of the former Soviet Union and those of eastern
Europe, the stabilization time profiles in Figure 2 represent a changing
population of countries. In particular, the observations for T+2 and T+3
come from eastern Europe and the Baltics, rather than from the other
republics of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, we divided the sample into
two groups: the first group comprises all countries of the former Soviet
Union (excluding the Baltics) and Mongolia, referred to as FSUM in Figure 3;
the second group includes all eastern European countries and the Baltics,
referred to as EEB in Figure 3.
Figure 3 presents profiles in stabilization time for the two groups of
countries. Since we do not show data points for which there are less than
three observations, no post-stabilization experience is shown for the FSUM
group. For this group, panels (a) and (b) show that the level of output has
continued to decline. Inflation, however, declined sharply in the year of
stabilization, as shown in panel (c), helped by a significant improvement in
public finances (panel (d)), albeit to an average deficit close to 10
percent of GDP.
As in the FSUM countries, growth in eastern Europe and the Baltics is
negative up to the year of stabilization (Figure 3). Real GDP growth turns
positive two years after stabilization. Indeed, output has begun to grow in
all these countries except FYRM, which was subject to a trade embargo. In
terms of levels, average GDP for the EEB countries never fell as low as it
did for the FSUM countries. Also, inflation in these economies never
reached the levels that it did in the former Soviet Union, reflecting the
fact that fiscal deficits were relatively lower. After stabilization, the
average rate of inflation quickly fell below 100 percent, and then below 50
percent, although the scale of the chart makes this difficult to discern.
4- Inflation and growth
The time profiles of Figures 2 and 3 suggest that growth follows
stabilization: inflation falls sharply in the year of stabilization and then
growth revives. It is also apparent that much higher fiscal deficits are
associated with higher inflation and thus lower growth.
1/ The temporary deterioration in the fiscal balance a year after
stabilization appears to be associated with the initial large expenditures
needed for structural reforms (for example, creating social safety nets and
cleaning up bad loans in the banking system).
- 12 -
We now report some efforts to investigate the growth-inflation
association in more detail. In Figure 4 we plot the average (logarithmic)
inflation and growth rates for each country during the period 1992-1994.
The relationship is negative and statistically significant (R^ « 0.63),
which confirms the existence of a negative correlation between inflation
and growth for the countries in this sample.
We also examine the relationship between inflation and growth by asking
whether there are individual country counterexamples to the negative
association found in the regression. First we consider the 14 countries
among the 26 where output growth had begun by 1994 (Table 2) . In 10 of
these countries, annual inflation fell below 50 percent in the same year as
growth began, or in an earlier year. The 10 countries are Albania, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia. Of the four remaining countries in which growth has
begun, inflation in Mongolia was just above 60 percent in 1994, the year
growth began. In the case of Armenia, inflation was reduced more or less
simultaneously with the recovery of output, and inflation was running at an
annual rate of just above 50 percent in Armenia in the first six months of
1995. Bulgaria and Romania were the only two countries where growth was
recorded as positive one or two years prior to inflation being reduced to
below 50 percent. However, in the first half of 1995, both countries were
still growing and inflation was reduced to an annual rate of less than 35
percent (annualized).
Examining the preliminary data for the first half of 1995 more
systematically, we find there are now 15 economies which have begun to
grow--the additional country is the Kyrgyz Republic, which also reduced
its inflation rate very sharply. In each of these economies, annualized
inflation was around 50 percent or less in the first six months of 1995.
These figures tend to support the view that low inflation--below 50 percent
in annual terms--is a precondition (i.e., is a necessary condition) for
growth to begin.
There is also the question of whether countries that have low inflation
are growing. As of 1994, 11 countries had reduced annual inflation below
50 percent. In ten of these countries, growth revived either in the same
year or with a lag of one to two years. The only exception is Tajikistan,
which had very low inflation but negative growth in 1994. In this case, the
low inflation was apparently due to an outright shortage of banknotes and
not a result of a deliberate anti-inflation policy. Preliminary data show
that Tajikistan returned to high inflation in the first six months of 1995.
In addition, as of mid-1995, two other countries--Georgia and FYRM--have
brought annualized inflation below 50 percent but growth has not yet
revived. As mentioned earlier, FYRM still faced trade embargoes during
this period.
In conclusion, there are only two countries in this sample that were
able to grow before inflation was reduced to an annual rate below 50 percent
per annum. Conversely, countries that succeeded in reducing inflation also
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began to grow, typically with a lag. For this group of countries,
therefore, stabilization appears close to being both a necessary and
sufficient condition for growth.
Ill. Determinants of Growth and Inflation
In the previous section we documented the time patterns of GDP,
inflation, and the fiscal balance in the transition economies during the
period 1989-1994. In this section we use some simple econometric analysis
to examine the determinants of growth and inflation. We run two sets of
regressions, the first with the average annual rate of growth of real GDP as
the dependent variable, and the second with the annual end-period inflation
rate, expressed as a logarithm, as the dependent variable. As explanatory
variables we considered: macroeconomic policies (exchange rate and fiscal
policy); the extent of structural reforms; and initial conditions--such as
the initial level of per capita GDP, dependence on intra-FSU and CMEA trade,
and the effects of the CMEA collapse in 1991 and the breakup of the Soviet
Union in January 1992.
1. Data definitions and methodology
The growth rate data are the same as those presented in the previous
section, and the inflation rate data are based on end-period prices, as
compared with annual averages in the time profiles. The figures for the
fiscal balance of the government (measured as a percent of GDP) are also the
same as those used in the previous section. The effects of the exchange
rate regime (as listed in Table 1) were captured by a dummy variable which
takes on a value of one when the exchange rate was fixed, and zero
otherwise. If the exchange rate regime changed during the sample period
1992-94 (as in Latvia and Lithuania), we adopted the procedure of assigning
the value of one (zero), if the exchange rate regime was fixed (flexible)
for more than six months in that year.
The extent of structural reforms in each year was measured as an
economic liberalization index (as computed by de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb,
1995, for the period 1989-94, based on information presented in the 1994 and
1995 Transition Report), where 0 represents an unreformed planned economy
and 1 represents a fully reformed economy. This index is a weighted average
of three indices: price liberalization and competition (with a weight of
0.3), trade and foreign exchange regime (with a weight of 0.3), and
privatization and banking reform (with a weight of 0.4). On the basis of
the yearly liberalization index, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995) construct
a cumulative liberalization index (CLI) to capture the depth of reforms over
the 1989-94 period. For econometric purposes, we used the CLI.
We experimented with two different ways of capturing the effects of the
trade disruptions caused by the breakup of the CMEA and of the Soviet Union.
The first was to use a dummy variable (Y92) which takes a value of 1 for the
year 1992 and 0 otherwise; the second was to use the ratio of CMEA exports
(or intra-FSU exports in the case of FSU countries) to GDP, presented in
- 14 -
Table 1. To the extent that intra-FSU exports are an underestimate of CMEA
exports for the FSU countries, the estimated coefficient associated with the
ratio of intra-FSU exports to GDP will provide a lower bound of the impact
of the breakup of the CMEA trade for FSU countries. Finally, World Bank
estimates of per capita purchasing power parity income figures for 1991 were
used.
To carry out the econometric analysis, we pooled the cross-section and
time series data for all 25 countries for three years, 1992-1994. The main
reason for excluding the period 1989-1991 is that macroeconomic policy as
commonly understood in market economies simply did not exist in more than
half the countries before 1992, especially in the former Soviet Union and
Albania. In particular, it is difficult to define the exchange rate regime
as either fixed or flexible during the pre-reform period.
Estimation was carried out using annual data for the three years for
the 25 country sample. 1/ We allowed for the intercept to vary across
countries (to capture "fixed effects"), except when the CMEA exports to
GDP variable (CMEAGDP) or initial income (LCPWB91) were included in the
regression, since the regressors become collinear (in that case, a common
intercept was assumed). This formulation enables us to test whether there
are differences across countries (presumably reflecting omitted variables),
modeled as parametric shifts in the regression function.
The role of the exchange rate regime in stabilization and growth has
been a subject of controversy for some time. Based on our reading of
previous experience, we expected growth to be higher and inflation lower in
countries with a fixed exchange rate. Stabilizations from high inflation
have typically relied on a nominal exchange rate anchor, which tends to
allow for a rapid remonetization of the economy (see Sargent (1982) and Vegh
(1992)). But such stabilizations are not sustainable unless fiscal deficits
are reduced. In the context of the transition economies, the benefits of
pegged exchange rates have been stressed by Hansson and Sachs (1994) and
1/ To be specific, the estimated equation for the pooled cross-section
time- series regress ions takes the form:
DEPVARit = a± + PiFIXEDit + P2FISCALit + P3CLIit +
+ P4Y92lt(P5CMEAGDPit) + p6LPCWB91lt + ult,
where DEPVAR is either log inflation or GDP growth, as defined above; i
(=1,..25) indexes the country; t (-1992, 1993, and 1994) indexes time; and u
is an error term assumed to be i.i.d over i and t and uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. FIXED is the exchange rate dummy; FISCAL is the
government balance variable (thus, a fiscal deficit would take on a negative
value); CLI is the cumulative value of the liberalization index; Y92 is the
time dummy for 1992; CMEAGDP measures the exports going to other CMEA or FSU
countries; and LPCWB91 is the log of per capita income in 1991, from World
Bank data.
- 15 -
Sahay and Vegh (1996). In addition, stabilization from high inflation has
typically been associated with growth rather than recession (Rebelo and
Vegh, 1995; Easterly, 1995).
We also expected inflation to be higher and growth lower the larger the
fiscal deficit, the smaller the extent of market-oriented reforms, and the
higher the ratio of CMEA exports to GDP (because the breakup of the CMEA
would then have a greater impact on the economy). Given the short time
period, we did not have a firm expectation on whether initial per capita GDP
would matter, or, if it did, in which direction. Endogenous growth theory
predicts a negative relationship between the initial per capita income and
the growth rate over some subsequent period in the long run. In the short
run, however, it is quite possible that the quality of economic management
may have been positively associated with income, in which case higher income
would be associated with more rapid growth during the transition.
Of course, since our regressions are not based on a particular
structural model, causation is in some cases not self-evident, and given
that the data are sparse and preliminary, the empirical analysis should be
viewed as exploratory and the results merely indicative of the relative
importance of some key policy and structural variables.
2. Output estimation results
The first three columns in Table 3 report the output growth results
obtained from the fixed-effects model. In all cases, country-specific
effects turned out to be highly significant (using a likelihood ratio test),
indicating that there were some differences across countries which are not
captured by the explanatory variables. Equation (1) shows that a pegged
exchange rate regime and tighter fiscal policy were conducive to higher
growth.
However, when further explanatory variables are added (equations (2)
and (3) in Table 3), the fiscal variable loses significance. These
additional variables--Y92, the time dummy intended to capture the effects
of the trade disruptions, and CLI, the cumulative liberalization index--are
highly significant. These results thus seem to confirm our prior that the
CMEA collapse and the breakup of the Soviet Union had a major negative
impact on growth across countries in 1992. 1/ The state of market-
oriented reforms, as reflected in the liberalization index CLI, appears
to have been critical in spurring growth (regression (3)). This is an
important result from the policy viewpoint. In addition, countries with
lower initial per capita income had lower output declines (not reported in
Table 3).
1/ We also found (but do not report) that countries with larger shares of
CMEA exports in total exports or intra-FSU exports suffered larger output
declines.
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Table 3. Fixed
FIXED
FISCAL
CLI
Y92
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Likelihood ratio
Probability value
Total observations
Effects Model
Dependen
(D
18.10
(3.04)
0.53
(2.31)
0.64
0.45
56.61
0.00019
75
for 25 Transition Economies
(t-statistics in
[Variable: GDP
(2)
15.77
(3.10)
0.30
(1.48)
-9.28
(-4.41)
0.75
0.60
70.00
0.00000
75
parenthesis)
growth
(3)
11.35
(2.00)
0.30
(1 -42)
7.42
(3.54)
0.72
0.55
53.98
0.00043
75
, 1992-94
Dependent Variable: Log
(4)
-2.72
(-3.03)
-0.09
(-2.47)
0.71
0.55
54.61
0.00035
75
(5)
-2.55
(-2.90)
-0.07
(-1.96)
0.69
(1.90)
0.73
0.57
57.00
0.00017
75
of inflation
(6)
-1.84
(-2.08)
-0.06
(-1.68)
-0.97
(-2.97)
0.75
0.61
46.53
0.00382
75
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The regressions thus suggest that countries that achieved macroeconomic
stabilization (through the use of fixed exchange rates) and undertook deeper
reforms grew faster. The results also point to the importance of initial
conditions--trade dependency and initial per capita income--in influencing
the growth rate during the transition.
3. Inflation estimation results
As in the growth regressions, we found the country-specific effects to
be highly significant in the inflation regressions (as indicated by the
likelihood ratio tests reported in Table 3). Our most prominent finding
(last three columns of Table 3) was that the pegged exchange rate dummy and
the measure of the fiscal position of the government are highly significant
and, when used together (equation (4)), explain more than 70 percent of the
time-series-cross-country variation in inflation. The negative shock
associated with Y92 is only marginally significant (at the 10 percent level,
equation (5)). In contrast, and somewhat surprisingly, the liberalization
index CLI turns out to exert a strong downward effect on inflation (equation
(6)). The inclusion of CLI, however, improves the fit only marginally. We
also found (but do not report in Table 3) that countries that started with
higher per capita incomes and those that suffered a larger CMEA shock had
higher inflation rates during the transition.
The results thus strongly suggest that, in addition to addressing the
fundamental fiscal disequilibria, a pegged exchange rate has been a key
component of successful inflation stabilization packages. Moreover,
structural reforms and initial conditions influenced the inflationary
process during the transition.
IV. Policy Lessons and Conclusions
As of the first half of 1995, growth had revived in 15 of the
26 transition economies studied here. With the exception of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, all eastern European countries are growing,
and so are some countries in the former Soviet Union. Considering the
extent of the transformations taking place in these economies, the decline
in inflation and the return of positive growth within a few years has to be
regarded as a major and striking achievement. The evidence discussed in
this paper strongly suggests that growth requires stabilization, and that
stabilization leads to growth. Moreover, it appears that for growth to
begin, annual inflation should be less than 50 percent. A fixed exchange
rate and smaller fiscal deficits seem especially important in reducing
inflation and raising growth rates.
However, there are alternative interpretations of the connection
between inflation and growth. For instance, it may be that stabilizations
succeed only if growth follows. If growth does not follow stabilization,
then governments may find it impossible to sustain the stabilization. While
this could be true, it is nonetheless striking that there are only two cases
in which growth has taken place without inflation having been reduced to
- 18 -
less than 50 percent per annum; moreover, even in these two cases inflation
was on its way down and had declined to less than 35 percent soon after
growth revived.
Alternatively, it could be argued that there is no inherent link
between inflation and growth in these economies but, rather, that the link
is forced by the policy conditionality of international financial
institutions which accompanies the access to external financing that is
necessary for growth. A variant of this view would be that it is the
benefit from foreign technical assistance provided by an IMF/World Bank
program that produces growth, rather than the financing by itself. In most
transition economies, inflation has been reduced in the context of explicit
IMF stabilization programs with two exceptions, Croatia and Slovenia, which
still received technical assistance from the IMF. 1/ Thus, the idea that
the stabilization-growth link is a product of IMF program design cannot be
dismissed. However, the fact that the inflation-growth results for the
transition economies so closely resemble those for other economies reported
by Bruno and Easterly (1995)--in their case that countries in which
inflation exceeds 40 percent per year get into trouble, and that countries
that stabilize from high inflation typically experience growth--leads us to
doubt that the results in this paper merely reflect IMF program design.
Yet another hypothesis is that countries that want to reform undertake
a whole set of actions, of which inflation stabilization is one, but that
the other components may be more important. The correlation between the
index of structural reforms and stabilization is high, and would thus
support this view. While the results in Table 3 strongly support the view
that structural reforms also promote growth, we do advance the hypothesis--
based on prior results and those reported in this paper--that stabilization
to an inflation rate of below 4 percent per month is a necessary condition
for sustainable growth. We also regard the evidence as supporting the
notion that transition countries that stabilize inflation will begin to grow
within two years, though this assumes that governments that stabilize have a
proclivity to reform, for one could imagine a country which stabilized
inflation but undertook no structural measures and failed to grow. An
additional aspect to keep in mind is that stabilization efforts in all these
countries are also likely to be mutually reinforcing to the extent that
these economies initially depend on each other for export markets.
It could also be argued that the results on stabilization and growth
presented in this paper reflect what has happened in the more advanced, more
market-oriented economies of eastern Europe, and that they are not
applicable to the other economies in transition--those of the former Soviet
Union and Mongolia. That could be, but we doubt it. For one thing, the
Baltics were, in most respects, deeply integrated into the economy of the
1/ The Serbian stabilization program, not part of this study, was also
highly successful in reducing inflation in early 1994 (Bogetic,
Dragutinovic, and Petrovic, 1994) without an explicit IMF arrangement.
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former Soviet Union, but they stabilized early and began to grow just as the
leading countries of eastern Europe. For another, in Albania, one of the
least developed economies of eastern Europe, growth revived soon after a
radical stabilization program.
While it is not possible to settle the issue of causation with the data
available so far, we venture a prediction that is implied by the hypotheses
we are advancing. The prediction is that the profile for the countries of
the former Soviet Union and Mongolia will follow the pattern seen in Figure
3 in the next few years. In other words, growth in these countries will on
average increase in 1995 and will turn positive in most of these countries
by 1996 or 1997.
- 20 -
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